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The 2016 Republican primary was an anomaly in that it was one of few instances in the
post-reform era of presidential nominations in which an insurgent candidate was able to defeat
party-favored, ‘establishment’ candidates and become the nominee of his party. In this paper, I
argue that institutions set up by both national parties have inadvertently given more influence
to the ideological extremes of their respective party, leaving the door open for a candidate with
factionalized support to take advantage and win the nomination, just as Donald Trump was able
to do. Here, I first examine the extent to which states vary based on ideology, and I examine
the partisan loyalty component of delegation apportionment by the national parties and its affect
on the outcome of nominations. I find evidence that Republican presidential primary voters vary
ideologically by state, but find null results for Democratic primary voters. I also demonstrate
that there is an incentive for candidates to moderate their message given the number of delegates
available from states of a moderate or opposite-leaning ideology, however this incentive has been
eroded as party have begun apportioning delegates to the national conventions to states that are
more ‘loyal’ to the party. This highlighted extremism can prove detrimental to the party goal of
nominating a candidate with broad support, under the correct conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2016 presidential election could be characterized as unconventional. Hillary Clinton became the
first female nominee of a major party in U.S. history. Beyond this, a billionaire reality television
star with no previous political experience was able to defeat a former First Lady, Secretary of State,
and senator to become President of the United States. What was perhaps even more unconventional
was the way the Republican primary played out. Donald Trump, a political newcomer, was able to
defeat 15 other major candidates, many of whom were viewed as ‘establishment’ favorites. Further,
in a nominating system that was perhaps the most responsive to the electorate as it has ever been,
the candidates who won their respective party’s nomination were the most unpopular candidates for
president in history. While Hillary Clinton was the favored candidate among Democratic leaders,
Donald Trump was far from the consensus pick among Republican Party elites. How then, in a
system that until this point had been largely explained by elite endorsements and behavior in the
invisible primary(Cohen et al., 2009), did both parties nominate candidates that were unpalatable
to a large swath of the general electorate? To understand this, this paper examines the structural
factors within the nomination contest that have begun to erode party control over nominations.
I aruge that both national parties have increasingly given undue influence to state delegations
that represent the ideological extreme of their party, leading to candidates with less broad appeal.
Further, I argue in this paper that primary electorates in presidential contests behave similarly
to the general electorate, and that in order for a candidate with broad appeal to win her party’s
nomination, the parties must take an active role in reversing the current trend, emphasizing states
that reward moderation.
I seek to explain three phenomena in this paper. First, I seek to answer whether Democrat-
ic/Republican voters in conservative/liberal states ideologically are different than their partisan
counterparts in states of the opposite ideology. Further, I seek to show this difference manifests
itself in vote choice for their party’s nominee for president. Second, if voters do indeed vote for
candidates closer to the ideology of their state, then I seek to demonstrate that there is an advantage
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for candidates to run moderate campaigns, as the number of delegates available to candidates from
ideologically moderate states (including states that are conservative for Democrats and liberal for
Republicans), although decreasing as of late, heavily outweigh the number of delegates available
from states ideologically consistent with the party. Finally, I argue that over time, due to a focus on
rewarding partisan loyalty in allocating delegates to state delegations, the national parties have given
increasingly inordinate amounts of influence to states that represent the ideological extreme of their
party. This, coupled with increased front-loading of primary calendars with ideologically extreme
states has contributed to the growing polarization of presidential primaries, and has diminished the
party’s role in selecting their candidate for president.
I begin first with an examination of existing research to build my argument that the electorate in
presidential primaries is not significantly ideologically different from the general electorate, and that,
given the primary is a nationwide contest, the median voter theorem should apply to presidential
primaries. Next, I review the realignments that have taken place among both political parties over
time, followed by a review of what makes for successful presidential primary campaigns. Finally, I
review campaign literature to demonstrate that candidates are strategic in primaries, focusing their
resources on states that they deem ‘worthy,’ which is largely determined by national party rules.
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APPLYING THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM TO PRIMARIES
Polarization among elites and American citizens has been steadily increasing over the past several
decades, stemming partly from sharp divisions among social groups and the growing presence of
‘culture wars’ in American society (Muste, 2014). Parties have also become much more ideologically
sorted (Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006) and citizens are now better able to identify key policy
positions of each party. This appears to portray the American public as divided and extreme. Given
that American politicians have begun to exhibit more polarized behavior in office and citizens
hold more dissimilar views than their partisan rivals, it seems logical that American society has
significantly drifted away from Downs (1957)’s assertion that politicians must appeal to the median
voter, and that, due to the propensity of extreme partisans to vote and the occasional exclusion of
independents, primary elections should serve as a breeding ground for ideological extremity among
voters.
Norrander (1989) finds that this may not be the case, particularly in presidential nominations,
concluding that “Fears about extremist primary voters selecting extremist candidates unpalatable
to the more moderate general election voters are unsupported” (584). Geer (1988) supports this
argument, as he finds that primary voters are not more ideologically extreme or partisan than their
party’s voters who voted in the general election who did not vote in their respective primary, and
that the biases presented are small enough to be inconsequential when selecting candidates. Further,
a contemporary analysis conducted by Sides, Vavreck and Warshaw (2018) supports these claims,
finding that primary voters are indeed similar to rank and file members of parties, and that “the
composition of primary electorates does not exert a polarizing effect above what might arise from
voters in the party as a whole.” Norrander (2015) also expands on her earlier work, and asserts that
presidential primary voters should be described as “the slightly more interested and knowledgeable
segment of the electorate,” rather than the more ideologically extreme segment. Thus, it appears
future success in the general election may not be the only reason that candidates in presidential
primaries should choose to run moderate campaigns.
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PARTISAN REALIGNMENT AND PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES
Given candidates may have a viable path to their party’s nomination through the moderate portion
of their electorate, it is important to address the ideological alignment of both parties, and how
each party has changed over time. Partisan realignment, issue evolution and the development of
the post-reform direct primary for presidential nominations took place almost simultaneously. The
one-party system under Democratic rule in the South began to falter when Franklin Roosevelt
proposed a plan to “pack” the Supreme Court, presumably with northern Democrats who could
vote to overturn precedents that enabled discrimination during the Jim Crow era in the south
(Aldrich and Griffin, 2018). White southern Democrats began to turn to the Republican Party
following Democratic president Lyndon Johnson’s embrace of Civil Rights and the anti-Civil Rights
campaign of Barry Goldwater that began the Republican embrace of white southerners (Carmines
and Stimson, 1989). The Goldwater campaign, as well as Richard Nixon’s victory in southern states
during his first presidential campaign changed voting habits among partisans, and particularly
among African Americans, for decades to come (Aldrich and Griffin, 2018). Thus, the ideology of
both parties began to become more sorted, leading to more liberal Democrats and more conservative
Republicans, with more Democrats occupying the northeast and west coast, while Republicans built
a stronghold in the conservative south and southwest.
The presence of African Americans and ‘blue dog Democrats’ in the South, as well as white
conservatives in the northeast have created scenarios in which factions can elect minority party
candidates to public office, and can serve as a moderating effect for the state. For example,
overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic Massachusetts has elected only one Democratic governor
since 1991, while electing 5 Republicans. Heterogeneity of constituents may prevent one-party
systems from taking over, and could allow for presidential candidates to seek a broad coalition to
become their party’s nominee for president.
Miller and Schofield (2008) argue that this heterogeneity among constituents may lead to a
shake up among partisan ideals and that increasing focus on social issues could drive the modern
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Republican Party to adopt more traditionally liberal and populist economic policies (which we
have begun to see during the Trump administration), and that Democrats could begin to appeal
to pro-business, social liberals, which could in turn lead to Democrats making gains in the South.
McKee and Hayes (2009), on the other hand, argue that growing polarization makes it more difficult
for moderate/conservative Democrats to use the South as a springboard, and that increases in
diversity make it more likely that a candidate like Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton will win the
nomination. McKee and Hayes (2009) also argue that growing polarization of the parties’ Southern
primary electorate will likely help to increase the ideological distance between the presidential
nominees, however, this does not seem to have come to fruition.
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SUCCESS IN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES
Beyond voters, institutional rules and forces play large roles in determining who wins the nomination
of the two major parties in American politics. From 1972-2016, nominations for president could
largely have been explained by the ‘invisible primary.’ Cohen et al. (2009) find that success in
presidential primaries in the post-reform era is largely attributable to the party-in-organization, and
that party endorsements and fund raising that take place in the ‘invisible primary,’ the time that
candidates spend preparing to run for president before publicly declaring their candidacy, allow for
party leaders to coalesce around their chosen candidate and send a ‘message’ to voters for whom
they should select to represent the party. This finding did not hold up in 2016, however, as Donald
Trump was able to garner enough populist support to secure the nomination without endorsements
and support from party elites.
Going beyond the invisible primary, institutional rules greatly impact the success of candidates
in presidential primaries. Presidential nominations act as a national election through successive state
contests, operated under different rules among different constituencies. Rules can vary, within limits
set by the Republican National Committee or the Democratic National Committee, in terms of who
can participate, when states hold their contests, whether that contest will be a primary election,
caucus, or convention, and how delegates to the national convention are allocated to candidates
based on outcomes. The national parties are also in charge of how many delegates are at stake in
each contest. There is little agreement, however, about how these rules impact candidate success.
Geer (1986) argues that the goal of a party nomination is to elect a candidate who has broad
electoral support and who can win the general election. Geer proposes that allocating delegates in a
proportional manner, adopting a preference ballot and allowing independent and “swing voters” to
participate would allow parties to gather an accurate measure of voter preference and would allow
them to nominate candidates with broad electoral support in the general election. Geer argues
this under the assumption that winner-take-all, loophole, and closed contests produce winning
candidates who do not accurately reflect voters.
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Norrander (1993) finds differences among the ideology of voters/winning candidates when
primary elections are held versus caucuses. She demonstrates that “home-state pride, regionalism,
and campaign spending are the most consistent explanations of support for both Democratic and
Republican candidates” from 1976-1988 in presidential nominations, while ideologically extreme
candidates tended to do better in caucuses rather than in primaries. Jewitt (2014), similarly,
finds that turnout in presidential primaries is significantly increased when primaries are held over
caucuses, delegates are allocated proportionally, and contests are ‘open’, allowing independents
and members of the other party to participate. Higher turnout thus leads to a more ideologically
representative electorate in primary elections. Other scholars, (Kenney (1983), Norrander (1992),
Patterson (2009)), however, find conflicting results of the effects of institutional rules on turnout
and candidate success in presidential primaries.
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CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND STATE-LEVEL INFLUENCE
Finally, campaign strategy and resource allocation can help explain who is successful in presidential
primaries, and where they are successful. Gurian (1986) finds that there are two resource allocation
strategies that candidates adopt in presidential nominations, depending on their position. The
first, usually adopted by ‘long-shot’ candidates who are unlikely to win the nomination, seeks to
maximize momentum, while the strategy adopted by more ‘serious’ candidates is to maximize
delegates. This seems to be the tale of the 2016 Democratic primary. Hillary Clinton sought to
maximize delegates to protect her front-runner status, while Bernie Sanders sought to capitalize
on momentum building contests in order to propel his campaign and catch Clinton in the delegate
race. Gurian also finds that early media coverage and the size of the state delegation are significant
determinants of candidate spending across states. Thus, it appears as though parties have an
opportunity to influence which states are the most important in the nomination process through
determination of the size of state delegations.
Similarly, Ridout, Rottinghaus and Hosey (2009) find that the institutional rules of presidential
primaries help determine where candidates spend their political resources, such as time and money.
The candidates take into account whether a contest is a primary or caucus, delegate allocation
methods, as well as the number of delegates at stake. This then sends a clear message that parties
wield quite a bit of influence over the primary process, and thus have the capability to shape how
the nomination plays out. It is from this assumption that I build my theory detailing how the




Presidential elections in post-reform America have followed a striking trend. Candidates for
president in both of the two major political parties have, more often than not, closely represented
the ideological center of the electorate. Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, Al Gore, and Mitt Romney are
just a few examples of this trend. This is surprising, as one might expect primary electorates to favor
ideologically extreme candidates, however this anecdotally appears to not be the case. Work done
by Sides, Vavreck and Warshaw (2018) demonstrates that the primary electorate in presidential
elections is not significantly different than that of “the party following,” which demonstrates that
the median voter theorem may still apply in presidential primaries, and that there may be an
incentive for candidates to moderate their message in primary campaigns for president. In short,
presidential primary voters appear to be less ideologically extreme than those of voters in other
primary elections, and they elect presidential nominees who do not represent the ideological extremes
of their respective parties, and a candidate with broad appeal, who is ideologically similar to a
larger portion of the electorate should be advantaged over ideologues in presidential nominations.
The apparent similarity between presidential primary voters and those of the general electorate
leads to an expectation that moderate candidates will perform better in states that are moderate, or
closer in ideology to the candidate than those candidates in the same party who are more extreme
ideologues. Candidates who are a better ‘fit’ for a state should be more likely to win, and I argue
this should take place not only in general elections, but in presidential primaries as well. Given
that presidential nominations are nationwide contests in which candidates must tailor their message
and policy views for more than one audience, it seems logical that appealing to the ideological
median of these primary votes, as Downs (1957) expects in interparty conflict, allows the candidate
to appeal to a larger swath of the electorate. Simply appealing to the ideological extremes of the
party limits candidates, and creates a very narrow path to the nomination. Thus, I hypothesize
that, as candidates become more dissimilar in ideology to the states they are competing in, the less
support they will receive in a primary state. I will refer to this as Hypothesis 1, or H1.
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Second, I argue that the number of delegates available to candidates in presidential primaries
are primarily from states that do not represent the ideological extreme of the party. There are
over 50 contests that candidates must compete in, and a large percentage of delegates available to
candidates come from states that do not reliably vote for the Republican or Democratic candidate.
Thus, my second hypothesis (H2) is that the percentage of delegates available to candidates in
presidential nominations from states that do not represent the ideological extreme of their party is
larger than the percentage of delegates in these ‘extreme’ states. If this is true, it seems logical that
there is a path to the nomination for candidates who are moderate and run moderate campaigns.
To anecdotally demonstrate both of these expectations, I look to the 2016 Democratic nomination
where Hillary Clinton, the eventual nominee for the Democratic Party and the more moderate
candidate, won 1335 pledged delegates from states with conservative/moderate electorates, making
up 47.5 percent of her pledged delegate total. Clinton needed only 336 delegates from traditionally
‘liberal’ states to receive a majority of pledged delegates. Similarly, the Republican nominee needed
1237 delegates to clinch the nomination. There were over 1700 delegates available to candidates
from traditionally ‘liberal/moderate’ states, signifying that a viable path to the nomination did
not only exist through states considered Republican strongholds. This indicates that the path to
the nomination for both parties can lie in states that do not represent the ideological leaning of
their party. Moderation in the primary can lead to a candidate’s success, as well as benefit the
candidate in the general election, and the parties would be advantaged to give more influence to
these states, if their goal is to nominate a candidate with broad appeal in the general election, and
avoid nominating unpopular candidates as they did in 2016.
Given the recent inability of the parties to exert influence on their nominating contests, I argue
that institutional rules implemented by the parties have contributed to this failure. Primarily, both
parties have begun apportioning delegates to state delegations using a formula that includes both
a ‘population’ and ‘partisan loyalty’ component. The Republican Party, for example, apportions
delegates to state delegations to the national convention in the following way: each state receives
three delegates per congressional district, and five delegates per senator, which constitutes the
‘population’ component of the apportionment. The ‘partisan loyalty’ aspect comes into play as the
party allocates additional delegates based on whether the state voted for the Republican nominee in
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a previous presidential election, has a Republican governor, senator(s), or GOP-controlled state
legislative chambers. The Democratic Party follows a similar apportionment technique.
This ‘partisan loyalty’ component of delegate apportionment by the national parties, I argue,
has contributed to growing influence in states that represent the ideological extremes of the party
over time. As the parties have become more sorted (Levendusky, 2009), and as states have become
more reliably Republican or Democratic in presidential and statewide elections, the percentage of
delegates given to states that reliably vote for their party, and thus may represent the ideological
extreme of the party, has dramatically increased. This increased delegate total should, in turn,
give these states more influence and attention from candidates and their campaigns (Gurian, 1986).
Thus, I argue that the national parties moving towards allocating additional delegates to states
based on partisan loyalty has contributed to the erosion of party control of primaries and led to
increased polarization of the presidential primary electorate.
Previous research on candidate resource allocation in presidential primaries has made clear
that candidates are strategic in where they spend most of their time and money, and that stems
partly from delegate apportionment by the national parties (Ridout, Rottinghaus and Hosey (2009),
Gurian (1986)). Candidates who perceive themselves as legitimate contenders for the nomination
will seek to maximize delegates and run the most efficient campaign possible (Gurian, 1986). Thus,
candidates should in turn spend more time and campaign resources in states that they perceive are
‘worth it,’ and this includes states with larger delegate totals as well as states in which they are
polling well. If candidates perform well in states with larger delegate totals, they will be that much
closer to the nomination and they will display to the public, the media, and their opponents that
they are viable, which in turn benefits their campaign.
I present here a simplified expected utility equation of allocating resources to a state in a
presidential primary:
E[u]allocating = epercent ∗D − c
where e is the candidate’s expected vote share in a state, D is the number of delegates available
and c are the costs associated with allocating resources to the state, including the opportunity costs
of allocating resources elsewhere. Thus, it seems that candidates should allocate more resources to
campaigns if the number of delegates available to them is large enough. For example, Democratic
candidates should forego campaigning and allocating large amounts of resources to Vermont, a state
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that has on average 24 delegates to the national convention even if they are likely to win, compared
to Texas, which has more than 200 delegates available. Winning roughly 10 percent of the delegates
in Texas would net the same number of delegates if the candidate won 100 percent of the delegates
in Vermont. Thus, it appears as though candidates will respond to increases in the apportionment
of delegates to states by national parties, increasing attention in states where they can win more
delegates1.
It follows that parties have the ability, and perhaps the interest, to manipulate where candidates
spend their time and money, given they control how delegates are apportioned to states. The
national parties also have final say over the sequence of contests, as well as delegate allocation
(particularly in the Republican Party), which could influence candidate resource allocation as well
(Geer, 1986).
Thus my third hypothesis is, as states have become more supportive of one party over another
in presidential elections over time, the percentage of delegates that the Democratic Party has
apportioned to liberal states and the percentage of delegates that the Republican Party has
apportioned to conservative states has increased, and similarly the percentage of delegates that the
GOP has allocated to liberal states and the Democratic Party to conservative states has decreased.
Further, I expect that the percentage of delegates apportioned to states that represent the ideological
extreme of the party has increased more than state’s percentage of the national population. I will
refer to this argument as Hypothesis 3 (H3). Stemming from Hypothesis 3, I seek to demonstrate
that, due to the success of moderates in moderate states, the parties would benefit from allocating
more delegates to states that are opposite their ideology or ideologically moderate, if they seek to
nominate a candidate who would have broad appeal in the general election. Finally, I expect that
over time, the number of delegates from ideological states in a presidential primary that takes place
during the ‘competitive window’ has increased, leading to an increased emphasis on ideological
extremity in primaries, which I will call Hypothesis 4 (H4).
1This assumes that delegates allocate their delegates in a proportional manner. This is almost always the case for
Democratic nomination contests, and more frequently than not the case in Republican primaries.
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MEASUREMENT AND OPERATIONALIZATION
For the purposes of this study, I am limiting my analysis to competitive2 presidential nominating
contests between 1980 and 2016. I use this time frame, as it encompasses all presidential nomination
contests in which the reforms proposed by the McGovern-Fraser Commission had been fully
implemented.
In order to operationalize my hypotheses, I first must define ideology, both for candidates and
constituencies. For constituencies, I use the sum of the respective party’s percent of the vote share
in the two previous presidential elections. In this instance, I use partisanship as a proxy for ideology
among constituents3.
To measure ideology of candidates for president, I use Bonica (2016)’s Database on Ideology,
Money in Politics and Elections measures. The database serves as an “on-going effort to perform
a comprehensive ideological mapping of political elites, interest groups, and donors, using the
common-space CFscore scaling methodology” (Bonica, 2016). More negative values correspond to
more ideologically liberal candidates, and more positive scores correspond to more ideologically
conservative candidates, with scores closer to zero representing moderates 4.
In order to test my first hypothesis regarding ideological congruence, I created a measure which
is the absolute distance between the candidate’s ideology and the ideology/partisanship of the state
2 I defined ‘competitive’ nominations to be contests in which the more than one candidate won a nominating
contest throughout the cycle and in which the incumbent president faced no serious challenge. This eliminates the
2000 Democratic nomination, as Al Gore won every contest, and the incumbent party’s nominations in 1984, 1992,
1996, 2004, and 2012.
3The correlation coefficient between the average previous presidential vote share and ideology scores generated by
Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s American Ideology Project that I aggregated to the state level correlate consistently
at levels near or above 0.9, so I argue presidential vote share is an effective proxy for ideology of constituents. The
first four figures in the Appendix show the relationship of these scores and presidential vote share for Democrats and
Republicans in 2016, Democrats in 2004, and Republicans in 2000. Given how closely these are correlated, I argue
that partisanship acts as a viable proxy for ideology of constituencies.
4 See the table in the Appendix to see the candidates included in the analysis, their ideology scores, ranging from
-2 to 2. I use the dynamic CFScores, which allow me to more accurately capture a candidate’s ideology at the time
they are seeking office. If candidates do not have a dynamic score for the period given, I use their previous dynamic
score in the period that is closest to that election.
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they are competing in. I take the absolute value of the candidate’s ideology score for this, giving a
measure of ideological extremity in the same direction for all candidates. Thus, as the ideological
distance goes up, the more dissimilar the candidate’s ideology is from the primary state, and the
worse I expect them to perform in that state. Methodologically, this also places ideology of states
and candidates on the same scale, from 0 to 2. For example, Hillary Clinton, the more ‘moderate’
candidate in the 2016 Democratic Primary, has an ideology score of -1.20, while Bernie Sanders
is more liberal, with a score of -1.60. Taking the absolute value I have a measure of both Clinton
and Sanders’ ‘liberal-ness’, at 1.203 and 1.518, respectively. I expect that as this distance between
the absolute value of the candidate ideology and their respective party’s previous presidential vote
share increases, the more ‘out of sync’ the candidate is with the state and their expected vote share
in the state should decrease. In Alabama, for example, I expect the more moderate Clinton to
perform better than the more liberal Sanders. The distance between the absolute value of Clinton’s
CFScore and the sum of Democratic vote share percentage in Alabama in the previous two elections
is smaller (1.20-0.771 = 0.429) than Sanders’ (1.60-0.771 = 0.829). Thus, I expect candidates with
smaller distances between themselves and the states they are competing in will receive a higher
vote share than in states where the distances are larger.
Next, to observe my expectations laid out in H2, I present the mean number of delegates
available to candidates in moderate and ideologically conservative and liberal states 5. For H3, I
collected the percentage of delegates each party allocated to each state, and calculated the difference
between the percentage of delegates allocated to a particular state by a party and the percentage of
the national population that state encompasses. I refer to this as the ’bias’ instituted by parties
giving higher percentages of delegates to states that constitute a smaller percentage of the American
public. Thus, I expect both the percentage of delegates in liberal states to decrease for Republicans
and increase for Democrats as well as the percentage of delegates in conservative states to decrease
for Democrats and the percentage of delegates in liberal states to decrease for Republicans. I also
5In order to create these categories, I took the average Democratic presidential vote share in these states over the
time period and ranked them from 1 to 51. I then split them into 3 groups, with 1-17 being the most conservative,
18-34 being the more moderate states, and 35-51 being the more liberal states. This is just for display purposes, and
the list exists in the appendix which shows which states fell into which category. I also conduct this analysis using
the average Democratic presidential vote share and classifying states based on their distance from the mean (plus or
minus one standard deviation), and the results are similar.
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expect ‘bias’ to increase over time, and as presidential vote share becomes more favorable to a party
in a particular state.
Finally, I use the percentage of vote share of the top three candidates the candidate received in
each state as the outcome variable. I also conduct this analysis using the vote share a candidate
received of all vote-getters in a state, including a control for the number of candidates competing in
a race, and I find similar results. These official results were collected from each state’s Secretary of
State or State Board of Elections website.
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CONTROLS
In order to test H1, I conducted an Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) Regression analysis, with
ideological distance between the candidate and constituency as my primary independent variable of
interest, and vote share in a state as my outcome variable. I included several control variables that
could skew my results. I include a dichotomous control variable for whether the contest allocates
its delegates in a winner-take-all fashion, as I expect more competition in these states due to the
high delegate reward, thus driving down expected vote share across the board. I also include a
control variable for the number of delegates available to candidates for similar competition reasons.
I also control for whether or not the contest is a primary or caucus, as some candidates (i.e., Bernie
Sanders in 2016) perform better in caucus states than in primaries. Next, I included a dichotomous
variable for whether or not the state the candidate is competing in is a state in which they previously
resided, or their ‘home state,’ as I expect familiarity with a constituency in a given state will
dramatically increase a candidate’s vote share in a state. Finally, I controlled for the number of
candidates competing in a given state, even though I have restricted the analysis to the top-three
vote-getters in a contest, as some contests only have 2 candidates competing. This additional control
helps account for variations in vote share that could be attributed to having three candidates in a
contest as compared to just two. More candidates means more choices for voters, who will be more
likely to spread their votes around as the number of candidates increases.
16
METHODS AND DATA/RESULTS
As stated, I conducted an OLS regression analysis with the outcome variable being top-three vote
share6 and the primary independent variable of interest being the ideological distance between
candidates and the primary states they are competing in. I restricted the analysis to the percentage
of the vote that a candidate received of the top-three vote getters in a state, in order to control for
variation in vote share amounts that may exist simply because of the number of candidates involved.
The results are presented in Table 1, below.














Residual Std. Error 0.190 (df = 1309)
F Statistic 42.272∗∗∗ (df = 6; 1309)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
6I rescale the vote share measure in order to account for differences in the number of candidates to account for the
candidate’s percentage of the vote of the top-three vote getters in a state. I still include a measure of the number of
candidates to account for instances like the 2008 and 2016 Democratic contests in which there were fewer than three
candidates competing.
17
I find statistically significant support for Hypothesis 1 at the aggregate level, as a one-unit
increase in ideological distance between a candidate and the primary state they are competing in
leads to an expected decrease in vote share of about 2.3 percent, after controlling for the other
variables such as whether or not the state they are competing in is their home state, and the number
of candidates in the race 7 As expected, candidates are expected to do significantly better in their
home states, about 22.2 percent better, all else equal. Similarly, adding another candidate to the
race decreases expected top-3 vote share by about 18.2 percent, ceteris paribus.
These findings suggest that primary candidates in presidential nominations are punished on
a statewide basis for being too ideologically dissimilar from the the statewide constituency. This
suggests that candidates may need to possess broad appeal in order to win not only the general
election, but also their respective primary, and suggests that a moderate candidate may perform
better in the primary, as they are better able to appeal to large swaths of the country. In order for
this to be true, however, the number of delegates available to candidates must not be won from
states that represent the ideological extreme of the party.
I find interesting results whenever I conduct this analysis separately, by party. The results are
presented in Table 2. Similar to the overall analysis, candidates do significantly better in their
home states, with the home state coefficient for Democrats being 0.267 and 0.168 for Republicans.
The number of candidates variable is also statistically significant for both parties, as it was in the
overall model. What is different, however, is the variable of interest, ideological distance between
the candidate and the state they are competing in. This variable is statistically significant and
negative for Republicans, with a one unit increase in ideological distance leading to an approximate
15.8 percent decrease in vote share for the candidate, ceteris paribus. This significance is not present
for Democratic contests, however. The coefficient of 0.002, is close to zero, and is in the opposite
direction that I expected. It appears as though Republican voters are punishing candidates for being
ideologically dissimilar from the states they are competing in, but this is not true for Democrats.
Next, I aim to show support for Hypothesis 2, that the number of delegates available to
candidates in both parties from moderate and states of the opposite ideology far outweighs the
7I included controls for whether or not the contest followed winner-take-all delegate allocation rules, as well
as whether or not the contest was a primary or caucus. The coefficients for these variables were not statistically
significant.
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Table 2: OLS Results by Party
Dependent variable:
Top 3 Vote Share
(Democrats) (Republicans)
Home State 0.267∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.042)
Ideological Distance 0.002 −0.158∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.027)






Adjusted R2 0.213 0.118
Residual Std. Error 0.181 (df = 660) 0.179 (df = 599)
F Statistic 30.995∗∗∗ (df = 6; 660) 14.552∗∗∗ (df = 6; 599)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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number of delegates available to candidates that represent the ideological extreme of their party. I
present descriptive statistics in Tables 3 and 4 below, demonstrating the percentage of delegates
available in each of the three types of states (conservative, liberal, and moderate), by party. Table
3 demonstrates the breakdown of delegates available in each competitive Republican nomination
over time by ideology, while Table 4 shows the breakdown of Democratic delegates available in each
type of state8 What is clear from Table 3 is that the percent of delegates available to Republican
candidates are overwhelming from moderate or liberal states, with conservative states only making
up at most 29.61 percent of the delegate total in 2016.











Table 4 shows that, on average, a little over half of the delegates available to Democratic
candidates are from moderate or liberal states. Although, not as important to candidates in
Democratic primaries as in Republican primaries, these tables demonstrate that candidates cannot
solely rely on states from the ideological extremes of their party to win the nomination, and there is
a clear incentive for candidates to moderate and try to appeal to a broad section of the electorate,
even in the primary 9.
8For the purposes of this project, I took the average Democratic presidential vote share in each state in each
presidential election between 1976 and 2016. I then ranked them, from least Democratic to most. I then split them
into 3 categories, with the most Republican in the first category, the middle category making up the moderate category,
and the most Democratic making up the liberal category. As mentioned earlier, I use presidential vote share as a
proxy for ideology.
9I replicated both Table 3 and Table 4, using an alternative classification method for states. Rather than using
rank order and splitting the states into 3 equal categories, I took the mean Democratic vote share in each state in
presidential elections from 1976 to 2016. I then classified states as ‘conservative’ if their average Democratic vote
share was less than the mean minus 0.5 standard deviations. Similarly, ’liberal’ states were states with an average
Democratic vote share higher than the mean plus one standard deviation. ‘Moderate’ states fell between these cutoffs.
They are represented by Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix. The results are similar, and do not change my findings.
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In order to demonstrate support for Hypothesis 3, that, over time, the percentage of delegates
apportioned by both national parties has increasingly favored the ideological extreme of their party,
I show this trend in Figures 1 and 2 below. Figure 1 shows the trend among Republicans and
Figure 2 among Democrats. Figure 1 shows support of this hypothesis among Republicans, as the
percent of Republican delegates coming from liberal states was around 45 percent. This percentage
has fallen, steadily over time, reaching a new low in 2016, with less than 35 percent of Republican
delegates being apportioned to liberal states. Conversely, the percentage of Republican delegates
apportioned to conservative states has gradually increased over time, with a low of 25 percent in
1976, and reaching a new high in 2016, just under 30 percent. The number of delegates awarded to
moderate districts has apparently slightly increased as well, however numerous changes occur, likely
as a reaction to the Republican nominee winning or losing these states in the previous election.
Figure 2 demonstrates the change (or lack there of) of the percentage of delegates apportioned
by the Democratic National Committee to liberal, moderate, and conservative states. The national
Democratic Party has had little variation in the percent of delegates apportioned to each type of
state, consistently over representing liberal states, and under representing conservative states. I find
preliminary support for Hypothesis 3 with the Republican National Committee’s apportionment,
but not with the Democratic National Committee from the above figures.
These results may seem promising for Democrats and troubling for Republicans, however a
simple maintenance of the status quo for Democrats and a decrease in the percentage of delegates
for Republicans must not be the end of the story. Perhaps the Republican Party is simply adjusting
for population increases in conservative states and decreases in liberal states. To test this, I created
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Figure 1: Republican Delegates Over Time
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Figure 2: Democratic Delegates Over Time
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Figure 3: Republican Bias Over Time
Figure 3: Republican Bias Over Time
a measure of ‘bias’ in delegate apportionment by both parties, in which I subtracted the population
percentage of the United States for each state from the percentage of delegates allocated by each
party. A more negative bias means that the national party is apportioning fewer delegates to
states than would be expected if delegates were allocated solely on population alone. This bias
is generated by the ‘partisan loyalty’ component of delegate apportionment discussed earlier, in
which states are rewarded with more delegates if they have a history of electing and supporting
Republican/Democratic candidates. Figure 3 above shows the average bias in conservative, liberal,
and moderate states that the Republican Party has instituted in their delegate apportionment
process.
There is a slight uptick in bias in favor of conservative states over time in the Republican Party,
with a a more negative bias toward liberal states. Moderate states see a back-and-forth see-saw
effect, as these states are frequently competitive between the two parties over time, and a loss by the
Republicans in swing or moderate states in the prior election leads to a decrease in the percentage
of delegates, and a subsequent increase when the Republican candidate is able to win these states
again. I see support for Hypothesis 3 from the Republican National Committee in Figure 3.
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Figure 4: Democratic Bias Over Time
Figure 4: Democratic Bias Over Time
Figure 410 above shows the Democratic Party’s bias towards or against conservative, liberal,
and moderate states in their apportionment of delegates to state delegations, similar to Figure 3 for
Republicans. Once again, I find support for Hypothesis 3 as the average bias against conservative
states in Democratic nomination contests has steadily been increasing, from near zero in the 1980’s
and early 1990’s to -0.2 percent in 2016. Liberal states have been more advantaged over time with
a steady increase of bias in favor of liberal states around zero in the late 1980’s and reaching a
new high in the 2012 and 2016 cycles of 0.2. An interesting finding evident in Figure 4 is that the
Democratic National Committee has also been relatively biased against moderate states over time,
as well.
Lastly, I examine my fourth hypothesis (H4), to determine whether the percentage of delegates
from liberal/conservative states available during the competitive window of the primary has increased
over time, thus drawing more attention and importance to these ideological outliers. Figure 5 below
shows the percentage of delegates from conservative states that are able to be won in the competitive
window of the Republican nomination cycle over time.
Figure 5 shows no real discernible pattern with the inclusion of the 2000 primary, a short
primary in which George Bush was able to win rather quickly. When omitting 2000, however, an
10I conducted the same analysis for Figures 1-4 using the classification I discussed earlier, assigning the ‘liberal’
label to states with an average Democratic presidential vote share higher than 0.5 standard deviations above the mean

































w Figure 5: Delegates Available During The Competitive Window of Republican Nominations
Figure 5: Delegates Available During the Competitive Window of Republican Nominations
argument could be made that the percentage of conservative delegates at play in the Republican
nomination has increased over time, reaching a peak in 2016 of over 20 percent.
No pattern is shown in the Democratic nomination cycle over time, as Figure 6 demonstrates,
signifying little support for H4 within the Democratic Party. There is no evidence that liberal states
are exerting any more influence in the competitive part of the Democratic nomination cycle now
than they were in the beginning of the post-reform era. This may be explained by the fact that
states are allowed to decide when they hold their primary or caucus, so long as it is after the first
four ‘carve-out’ states, as ordained by the national parties. This gives the national parties less
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Figure 6: Delegates Available During the Competitive Window of Democratic Nominations
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
To review my findings, I find support for Hypothesis 1, that as candidates become more ideologically
dissimilar from the primary state they are competing in during a presidential primary, they will see
a statistically significant reduction in vote share within that state. When looking at this analysis by
party, however, this appears to be largely a Republican phenomenon, while the distance variable for
Democrats is not statistically significant.
I use descriptive statistics to show support for my second hypothesis, that the number of
delegates available to candidates in both parties is significantly higher among moderate states and
states of the opposite ideological leaning than of states that represent the ideological extreme of a
respective party. This begins to show incentives for moderation among primary candidates.
Hypothesis 3 was supported among both parties, as both the Democratic and Republican
National Committees have increasingly biased delegate apportionment against states that reliably
support the other party. Finally, I do not find support for my fourth hypothesis, as there is no
clear pattern among either party demonstrating an increase in the percent of delegates that align
ideologically with a party during the competitive window of nominations has taken place. A case
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could be made that this has happened in the Republican Party, however, the 2000 nomination
complicates this argument.
These findings are valuable, especially for party elites, if they seek to regain control of their
nomination processes. My analyses show, among Republicans, a desire for a candidate with broad
appeal among the electorate. My analysis also provides an explanation as to why party elites have
begun to lose control of their nomination processes. While historically, candidates with broad
appeal have won their party’s nominations, the parties have begun apportioning delegates in such a
way that prioritizes partisan loyalty. By creating a system which apportions large delegate hauls
to conservative states for Republicans and liberal states for Democrats, the national parties are
sending a message to candidates that these are the most important states, and candidates who
adopt delegate maximization strategies will focus their attention on these states. This, in turn,
gives more influence to ideologues and extreme candidates, thus leading to the nomination of a more
extreme candidate than the party would want, and ultimately a candidate who may be unpalatable
to the general electorate. I argue that by forcing candidates to build a broad coalition of support in
the primary, parties will discourage ideological extremity, and will receive their desired outcome to
put forth the best candidate in the general election, and a candidate that is more representative of
the country as a whole. I have demonstrated that a viable path to the nomination exists in both
parties through ideologically moderate and dissimilar states, and both parties would be wise to
begin giving these states their fair share of influence.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, while the 2016 Republican nomination cycle was surprising to many, I argue that it
shouldn’t have been so. The nomination seemed to be the result of a culmination of a decades
long process of devaluing one portion of the primary electorate (liberal states), and overvaluing
another (conservative states). By doing so, both parties, but particularly the Republican Party,
incentivized extremism among candidates by signaling to campaigns that they should spend more
time and campaign resources in ideologically similar states. The partisan loyalty component of
delegate apportionment by national parties has reinforced polarization within the electorate, and
has led to this increase of influence by ideologically extreme states. I do not discount the role that
candidates play in this scenario, nor the role of voters. I am simply making the argument that
party elites should not be surprised that ideological extremity has arisen in recent presidential
nominations, where it lay dormant for quite some time, given the path the parties have followed to
choose their nominee. This could become even more consequential in a future primary in which
the winner is not clearly known following the primary cycle, or a scenario in which no candidate
receives a majority of delegates on the first ballot. Improper delegate apportionment could prove the
difference between the parties nominating candidates with broad appeal or nominating an ideologue
who a large portion of the electorate does not like.
Lastly, I have shown that voters in presidential primaries do seem to be ideologically different
depending on where they live, and that this difference manifests itself in vote choice for a candidate.
This is particularly true for Republican voters, as it seems Republican voters from liberal states,
like California, support candidates who are more moderate at higher rates than do Republicans
from more conservative states, like Alabama or Mississippi. This is important, as it is clear that
Republicans who can build a broad coalition of support nationwide may be advantaged in the
primary. This of course, must be coupled with the party reversing course and placing more value on
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Table 5: Candidate, Election Cycle, and Dynamic CFScores, Part 1
Candidate Year Dynamic CFScore
Dole, Bob 1996 0.62
Buchanan, Pat 1996 1.28
Forbes, Steve 1996 0.72
Alexander, Lamar 1996 0.91
Keyes, Alan 1996 1.44
Clinton, Bill 1992 -0.59
Brown, Jerry 1992 -0.48
Tsongas, Paul 1992 -0.66
Harkin, Tom 1992 -0.79
Kerrey, Bob 1992 -0.64
Bush, George HW 1988 0.80
Dole, Bob 1988 0.50
Robertson, Pat 1988 1.37
Kemp, Jack 1988 0.73
Dukakis, Michael 1988 -0.70
Jackson, Jesse 1988 -0.88
Gore, Al 1988 -0.44
Simon, Paul 1988 -0.73
Gephardt, Dick 1988 -0.32
Hart, Gary 1988 -0.68
Mondale, Walter 1984 -0.66
Hart, Gary 1984 -0.67
Jackson, Jesse 1984 -0.88
Glenn, John 1984 -0.21
McGovern, George 1984 -0.86
Reagan, Ronald 1980 0.98
Bush, George HW 1980 0.81
Anderson, John 1980 -0.57
Baker, Howard 1980 0.75
Connally, John 1980 0.93
Carter, Jimmy 1980 -0.27
Kennedy, Ted 1980 -0.69
Brown, Jerry 1980 -0.55
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Table 6: Candidate, Election Cycle, and Dynamic CFScores, Part 2
Candidate Year Dynamic CFScore
Kerry, John 2004 -0.94
Edwards, John 2004 -0.92
Dean, Howard 2004 -1.40
Lieberman, Joe 2004 -0.60
Clark, Wesley 2004 -1.14
Obama, Barack 2008 -1.22
Clinton, Hillary 2008 -1.05
Edwards, John 2008 -1.11
McCain, John 2008 1.05
Huckabee, Mike 2008 1.24
Romney, Mitt 2008 1.09
Paul, Ron 2008 1.56
Romney, Mitt 2012 0.83
Gingrich, Newt 2012 1.39
Santorum, Rick 2012 1.30
Paul, Ron 2012 1.59
Clinton, Hillary 2016 -1.20
Sanders, Bernie 2016 -1.60
Trump, Donald 2016 1.44
Cruz, Ted 2016 1.47
Rubio, Marco 2016 1.09
Kasich, John 2016 0.80
Carson, Ben 2016 1.49
Bush, Jeb 2016 0.90
Christie, Chris 2016 0.61
Gilmore, Jim 2016 1.06
Fiorina, Carly 2016 1.21
Bush, George 2000 0.85
McCain, John 2000 0.54
Keyes, Alan 2000 1.42
Forbes, Steve 2000 1.01
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